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THE QUARTERLY SURVEY

the court cannot confer; only the defendant can authorize another
to appear in his behalf.
CPLR 316: Mailing requirement interpreted.
In Gross v. Gross,31 a divorce action, plaintiff-wife sought support and maintenance. Unable to effectuate personal service, she
was granted an order to serve defendant by publication pursuant
to the procedures of CPLR 316. The court first concluded that it
was proper to assert in personam jurisdiction over the defendant
as a resident of New York since the parties were married here
and made their residence here. Although the defendant could not
be found, no evidence was submitted that he was a non-resident
and thus, a presumption of his residence continued.32 The court
then met a challenge that due process had not been fulfilled by
substituted service, concluding that publication afforded defendant
reasonable notice and a fair opportunity to be heard.33
This case may provide one of the few interpretations of 316's
mailing requirement. Under 316, where service is by publication
in a matrimonial action, a copy of the summons must be mailed
to the defendant. The standard by which such a mailing's effectiveness is to be judged can possibly be gleaned from the provision
under which such mailing may be dispensed with by the court.
The section states that such mailing must be made "unless a place
where such person probably would receive mail cannot with due
diligence be ascertained." 34 This would seem to suggest that such
mailing as establishes a probability that it will reach the defendant
is sufficient. Here, the mailing of the summons to the husband in
care of his father was held to be satisfactory.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 7(c): Court of Appeals clarifies breadth
of suprene court's jurisdiction.
As a court of general original jurisdiction, the supreme court,
in the past, has been held to have subject matter jurisdiction over
all common-law actions 35 and all statutorily-established actions unless the Legislature in creating the latter specifically negatives this
result.3 6 The 1962 amendment to section 7 of the judiciary article
of the New York Constitution has prompted recent review of the
3156 Misc. 2d 286, 288 N.Y.S2d 674 (Sup. Ct King's County 1968).
Harris v. Harris, 83 App. Div. 123, 82 N.Y.S. 568 (2d Dep't 1903).
-33McDonald v. Mabee, 243 U.S. 90 (1917); Rawstorne v. Maguire, 265
N.Y. 204, 192 N.E. 294 (1934).
34CPLR 316(b) (emphasis added).
35
In re Steinway, 159 N.Y. 250, 255-58, 53 N.E. 1103, 1104-05 (1899).
38
Thrasher v. United States Liab. Ins. Co., 19 N.Y.2d 159, 166, 225
N.E.2d 503, 506, 278 N.Y.S.2d 793, 798 (1967).
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The amendment pro-

[i]f the legislature shall create new classes of actions and proceedings,
the supreme court shall have jurisdiction over such classes of actions
and proceedings, but the legislature may provide that another court or
courts shall also have jurisdiction and that actions and proceedings
of
37
such classes may be originated in such other court or courts.
The first opportunity to construe the amended section 7 came
in Seitz v. Drogheo,3 s with an attack on the constitutionality of a
new legislatively created action, namely, the modification and enforcement of support provisions of foreign decrees of divorce,
whether or not based on grounds for divorce recognized by New
York. 9 The Court upheld the constitutionality of this cause of
actibn, holding that section 7 authorized its creation and permitted
the family court to grant such support, provided concurrent jurisdiction was given to the supreme court.
Since this form of proceeding was created in 1965, it would
have been sufficient here for the Court to construe the constitutional
provision to apply to any proceeding established after 1962, the
date of the amendment to the judiciary article. But, the Court
went further in its rationale, and stated that section 7 referred to
all forms of action unknown to the common law.
In a second case, Kagen v. Kagen,40 this sweeping statement
was applied to a form of proceeding created long before the amendment to .section 7, namely, an action for support brought independently of any marital action. In a four-to-three decision the Court
held that the supreme court had jurisdiction over any statutorilycreated form of action.
The Court recognized that this interpretation was not the only
possible reading of the amendment, but based its decision on the
concept that the supreme court's original jurisdiction should be
unlimited. 41 , A single exception was carefully noted: the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Court of Claims over suits against New York
State.. This distinction was drawn "because the exclusive jurisdiction of that court is based not on the form of actions it handles,
but rather42 on the limits the state has imposed on its waiver of
immunity.
37N.y. CONsT. art. VI, § 7(b) (emphasis added).
"1s 21 N.Y.2d 181, 234 N.E.2d 209, 287 N.Y.S.2d 29 (1967).
3 N.Y. DoM. REL. LAW § 466. The attack was based on the lack of
specific authbrity for this type of hction in the constitutional provision for
the family court, N.Y. CONsT. art. VI, § 13(c).
4021 N.Y2d 532, 236 N.E.2d 475, 289 N.Y.S.2d 195 (1968).
4 1
De Hart v. Hatch, 3 Hun 375 (1st Dept 1875).
42 The Court depended for this distinction on People ex rel. Swift v.
Luce, 204 N.Y. 478, 97 N.. 850 (1912).. -This case 'is dubious authority
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The dissent, speaking through Judge Jasen, warned of the
danger of forum-shopping, which the majority had found unlikely
because of the eased transfer provisions of the amended judiciary
article.43 Another point emphasized by the minority was that the
majority's interpretation usurped the Legislature's function to
decide whether or not to deprive specialized courts of their exclusive jurisdiction.
N.Y. Const. art. VI, § 19(a): Consent of parties not needed to
effect transfer to lower court.
The possibility of transfer of an action to a court with lower
monetary jurisdiction is a valuable factor in discouraging plaintiffs
from overstating their claims for damages, CPLR 325(c) provides
for removal on consent to a court of limited jurisdiction.
Where it appears that the amount of damages sustained are less than
demanded, and a lower court would have had jurisdiction of the action
but for the amount of damages demanded, the court in which an action
is pending may remove it to the lower court upon reduction of the
amount of damages demanded to a sum within the jurisdictional limits
of the lower court and upon consent of all parties to the action other
than a defendant who has interposed no counterclaim and over whom
the lower court would have had jurisdiction if the action had originally
been commenced there....
However, section 19(a) of the amended judiciary article of the
New York Constitution makes no mention of either the requirement of showing excessive damages claimed, or the method of
transfer by consent of parties. The only requirement of the constitutional transfer provision is that the lower court have "jurisdiction over the classes of persons named as parties." 44 A recent
case, Hesse v. Hrubsa,45 discussed the question raised by the second
change, i.e., whether consent of the parties remains a valid method
of obtaining transfer.
Two transfers were involved-one from the supreme court to
the county court, and one from the county court to the district
court. The defendant, a non-resident of Suffolk County, had been
served outside of that county, preventing either the county or district court from taking jurisdiction.46 However, when the transfers
were actually made, the defendant appeared without protest and
for such a distinction since it is based on the premise that the Legislature
cannot withdraw any form of action, even if statutorily created, from the
jurisdiction of the supreme court.
43N.Y. CoNsT. art. VI, § 19.
44N.Y. CONST. art. VI, § 19(a).
4555 Misc. 2d 610, 286 N.Y.S.2d 183 (Dist. Ct. Suffolk County 1968).
46 N.Y. JuDICrARv LAw § 190(3).

